Crédit photo, Getty Images
The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a prominent separatist movement, has joined forces with the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) to launch a fresh military offensive this weekend. Their objective is to regain control of northern and central Malian territories currently held by government troops.
This new push comes less than two months after the FLA, in an alliance with the Al-Qaeda-linked Jamaat-e-Nosra al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), initiated coordinated assaults on April 25 across northern, central, and southern Mali.
Those earlier attacks notably struck Kati, a critical stronghold for Mali’s military leadership, severely shaking the government led by Assimi Goïta. The Minister of Defense, Sadio Camara, was killed, and Modibo Koné, the head of intelligence services, sustained serious injuries.
During the April offensive, the FLA briefly seized Kidal, a city that had become a highly symbolic victory for the Malian army and the Russian Africa Corps (AFRICC) troops following its capture in 2023, representing their success in the country’s north.
However, the Malian army announced it had recaptured Kidal after a counter-offensive that followed the April 25 attacks.
Several social media accounts and specialized Sahel security blogs have reported a renewed mobilization by the FLA, including the recruitment of inhabitants from northern Mali in preparation for this upcoming offensive.
In response to the escalating threat, Malian authorities declared on June 4 a total reward of $12.4 million for any information leading to the apprehension or demise of JNIM and FLA leaders.
The Malian army and the Africa Corps have intensified their operations in the country’s northern regions, alongside significant investments in military equipment aimed at thwarting potential new assaults.
Understanding the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)
The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) was officially established on November 30, 2024, in Tinzaouatene, a small town on Mali’s northern border with Algeria. It emerged from the consolidation of various Tuareg and Arab armed separatist groups, all united by the goal of achieving an independent Azawad.
Azawad refers to a specific territory encompassing the areas between Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal, and Ménaka. This region was unilaterally declared an independent state in 2012 by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), one of the foundational groups that later formed the FLA.
The FLA is the successor to the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PDA), which itself was a coalition formed by several separatist factions.
These precursor organizations included the MNLA, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), rebel elements of the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), and the pro-government Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (Gatia).
The roots of Tuareg unity, however, extend further back to 1988 in Libya, where the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA) was founded by Algerian and Libyan exiles under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali, who now heads the JNIM.
Bilal Ag Acherif, born in Kidal in 1977, serves as the President of the FLA, playing a pivotal role in the movement’s political direction and governance.
Acherif’s close associate, Alghabass Ag Intalla, holds the position of FLA military chief, responsible for reconciliation efforts and managing relations with the JNIM. Intalla is the son of the late Ifoghas traditional chief, Intallah Ag Attaher, who passed away in 2014.
Mohamed Ramadane acts as the group’s official spokesperson.
The FLA’s aspirations
Crédit photo, Getty Images
Certains Arab and Tuareg communities have been in opposition to the Malian government since the nation gained independence in 1960. This long-standing tension has fueled armed rebellions in 1962, 1990-1996, and most recently in 2012.
The primary goal of the FLA is to establish a “Republic of Azawad.” This proposed state would serve as a homeland for an estimated two million Tuaregs, a people dispersed across West and North Africa, a consequence of colonial fragmentation.
The FLA accuses the Malian government of systematic political, economic, and cultural marginalization of these communities.
While northern Mali boasts rich reserves of salt, uranium, gold, diamonds, and phosphates, it suffers from minimal governmental investment in essential infrastructure such as schools, health centers, water and electricity supply, and roads.
Acherif recently articulated the movement’s rationale for independence, asserting that Azawad “was annexed to Mali without regard for its history as an independent civilization.”
The Malian government has leveled accusations against neighboring Algeria and Mauritania, alleging their support for the FLA. Algeria previously mediated the Algiers Accords, signed in 2015 between the Malian government and northern armed groups, an agreement that Mali unilaterally abandoned in January 2024.
Ukraine, Mauritania, and France have also faced accusations of backing the FLA’s cause.
The precise number of FLA combatants remains undisclosed. However, Ramadane has stated that the group maintains a “strong military presence extending from the Mauritanian border to the Algerian border.” Their primary camps are situated near the Algerian frontier, including in Kidal and Tinzaouatine.
Between 2024 and 2025, the FLA predominantly utilized kamikaze drones in its attacks. Nonetheless, the group frequently releases images depicting armed fighters, typically mounted on lengthy convoys of pick-up trucks traversing the desert terrain.
The evolving relationship between FLA and JNIM
JNIM leader Ghaly himself was a prominent figure in the Tuareg rebellion before shifting allegiance to radical Islamist groups in the late 1990s. The current relationship between JNIM and the FLA, however, solidified in mid-2024.
In May 2024, Ag Intalla reportedly announced that the CSP-DPA had initiated discussions aimed at a rapprochement with the JNIM. Ramadane later clarified that the FLA and JNIM had agreed upon a “tacit non-aggression pact.”
Later, in July 2024, the CSP-DPA, with assistance from the JNIM, inflicted significant casualties on Malian soldiers and Russian Wagner Group mercenaries during the Battle of Tinzaouatene.
The JNIM subsequently criticized the FLA, accusing them of failing to acknowledge the “sacrifices and generosity” demonstrated by the Islamist group during the intense fighting.
By March 2025, Malian media outlets reported that following talks held in late February 2025, the two groups had agreed to jointly combat the Malian army and Russian troops. After the widespread attacks across Mali on April 25, both groups publicly acknowledged their partnership.
The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) characterized this agreement as a “strategic convergence” aimed at overthrowing the Malian military government. Conversely, the National Islamic Front of Mali (JNIM) asserted that this partnership became viable after the Tuaregs expressed their readiness for “the establishment of Sharia law.”
Acherif conveyed to Al Arabiya Al Hadath that the FLA and JNIM operate within the same region and confront a shared adversary.
“While ideological differences exist, we are engaged in discussions to find local solutions,” he affirmed.
However, the long-term viability of this partnership remains uncertain, given the inherent ideological disparities and differing ultimate objectives of the two groups.