The definition of a power shift often fluctuates, swayed by the perceived interests and whims of the international community and its neighboring states. In this context, the “designation” of Transitional President Michel Kafando in Burkina Faso was deemed extra-constitutional. For at least twelve months, Burkina Faso was set to operate under provisional institutions, meticulously constructed piece by piece.
Much like assembling a Lego set, the transitional government structures in Burkina Faso began to take shape. Following the dramatic exit of Blaise Compaoré, often referred to as the ‘Sphinx of Kosyam’, and the subsequent emergence of military figures onto the public stage, Ouagadougou gradually regained a semblance of calm.
Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, appearing seemingly from nowhere, quickly filled the power vacuum, assuming all the prerogatives of a Head of State. His true intentions were a subject of intense speculation. How did he manage to integrate himself among the protesters and political party leaders so seamlessly? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, in an attempt to retain control, a pre-arranged strategy between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré? Initially, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) aligning with the populace naturally sparked distrust and numerous suspicions. The military’s actions in the initial days – including the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly – raised fears of a military junta. This threatened to strip the people, who had sacrificed and shed blood, of their hard-won victory.
True to form, the African Union immediately threatened to isolate Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, heads of state from ECOWAS – including John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Senegal – arrived en masse to engage with the military leadership, urging them to moderate their stance. The precedents set by captains like Moussa Dadis Camara in Guinea and Amadou Sanogo in Mali undoubtedly prompted Burkinabé officers to reconsider. They understood that seizing power by force would no longer go unpunished, and a protracted resolution process risked isolating the nation and fostering widespread unpopularity.
Ultimately, the military negotiated a pragmatic compromise, formalized in the Charter of the Transition. The agreement stipulated that a civilian would lead the transitional presidency, while the military would maintain significant influence over the government. A 90-member legislative body, the National Transitional Council (CNT), was established to accommodate those who had spearheaded the struggle. A Designation Committee, comprising about twenty members, was tasked with the crucial responsibility of naming a Transitional President of the Republic. This was a fixed-term arrangement, set to conclude in November 2015, coinciding with the end of President Blaise Compaoré’s original mandate.
For the selection of the Head of State, each vital national component – the army, civil society, opposition parties, and religious and traditional authorities – was required to submit a shortlist within a specified timeframe. Ultimately, five individuals were shortlisted:
- The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, editor of the weekly L’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ critical stance against the former regime.
- The army adopted a broader approach, diversifying candidate profiles to include: Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso, a diplomat Michel Kafando, and a woman who was also a former minister, Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, the Archbishop, a strong early contender, declared his disinterest in the role, preferring to focus on his current ministry.
The remaining two candidates held a distinct advantage over the others: their extensive experience within major international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had served at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented his nation at the UN headquarters in New York, first between 1981 and 1982, and again from 1998 to 2011. In the ‘Land of the Upright Men’ (Burkina Faso), an invisible divide often separates the populace into those for or against Thomas Sankara. This implicit ideological split often influenced the trajectory of political figures. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity from 1984 to 1987. Michel Kafando, conversely, was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Thomas Sankara’s government under President Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo in 1982. The two men reportedly had disagreements regarding the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and held diametrically opposed ideologies.
A career in an international organization offered a dual benefit: an enhanced CV and an invaluable network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists put forward by the opposition.
For a limited period, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, was compelled to set aside his cattle and chicken farming in Saponé for a noble cause: safeguarding the nation in crisis. He assumed both the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlined diplomatic channels, providing a single point of contact for international partners and effectively circumventing Prime Minister Isaac Zida.
The unfolding situation in Burkina Faso was closely monitored by several international capitals: Accra, then chairing ECOWAS; Addis Ababa, for the African Union; and Paris and Washington, due to significant geopolitical interests. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, several heads of state – from Mauritania (representing the AU), Ghana (representing ECOWAS), Togo, Benin, Mali, and Niger – traveled to Ouagadougou, signaling a re-acceptance of Burkina Faso. Did this strong international presence implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a constitution that had been suspended just weeks prior? The United States, adhering to its principle of non-cooperation with non-democratically elected leaders, faced a dilemma regarding Burkina Faso. Ultimately, the international community orchestrated a strategy to legitimize the military takeover and restore a semblance of constitutional order. This ensured that American reconnaissance aircraft could remain stationed in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as crucial bases for monitoring the Sahel region.
Out of 26 ministerial positions, the military secured four crucial portfolios: the Prime Minister also held the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, a former Security Minister in 2011, was appointed to the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, spokesperson for Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, took charge of Sports; and Boubacar Ba assumed duties at the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo was allocated the position of Keeper of the Seals – a form of consolation prize – while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, resigned just days after his appointment due to public pressure regarding his alleged mishandling of the Norbert Zongo case as a former prosecutor.
The National Transitional Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected Chériff Sy Moumina, one of the unsuccessful candidates for the transitional presidency, as its president. He was chosen by his peers with 71 out of 90 votes. The next crucial steps involved completing the institutional framework and mechanisms necessary to guide Burkina Faso towards transparent and equitable elections, including establishing the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), drafting the electoral code, and enacting organic laws.
What objectives for this brief transitional period?
Since early December, Michel Kafando signed the presidential decree establishing the National Reconciliation and Reforms Commission (CRNR). The scope and duration of this body’s mandate remained key questions. Over 27 years after the assassination of Thomas Sankara, the ‘Land of the Upright Men’ aimed to finally embark on a process of catharsis. Shortly after his appointment, one of President Michel Kafando’s initial decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also played a role, announcing that the case of President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully reopened” and, if necessary, Burkina Faso would request Morocco’s “extradition” of former President Blaise Compaoré.
Through a series of public announcements, the current leadership effectively opened a Pandora’s Box. Such complex cases demand considerable time, likely extending beyond the transitional period. Were these declarations made to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s primary focus. In this regard, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s special chief of staff and thus Isaac Zida’s direct superior – was relieved of his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also director of External Documentation, essentially the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.
The question of Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida and Commander Théophile Nikièma’s loyalty towards General Gilbert Diendéré remained pertinent. Burkina Faso successfully de-escalated the political crisis of October 30th, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, with relatively few major incidents. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial clashes could have easily triggered a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to prioritize the organization of elections rather than implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other living civilian and military figures by re-opening the Sankara file?
How could a witch hunt be avoided? Two general directors of major national companies, considered close to the ousted president’s family, were swiftly dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). While an act of contrition doesn’t entirely absolve past transgressions, it contributes to reconciliation; this was the recent approach taken by Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, the nation paid homage to the seven individuals who lost their lives during the events of October 30th and 31st, now laid to rest in the Gounghin cemetery.
Would the CRNR endure beyond the conclusion of the transitional period? With all institutions now established, political figures and parties were poised to take center stage. No prominent political leader sought a seat within either the Executive or the CNT, which effectively barred them from running in future general elections. Presidential candidates were already at the starting blocks. The formation of the CNT also prompted the self-dissolution of the CFOP, the opposition coalition. The political contest was certainly set to intensify in early 2015.