The synchronized assaults by Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) on April 25, 2026, represent a significant strategic shift in Mali’s security landscape since 2012. By striking Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré simultaneously, these groups have starkly exposed the limitations of a security approach heavily reliant on foreign partners. The recapture of Kidal severely undermines the ruling junta’s claims of legitimacy and reveals the vulnerabilities of its partnership with Russia in confronting jihadist forces. While a direct military takeover of Bamako appears unlikely in the near term, JNIM continues to wage a persistent war of attrition. This escalating instability poses an increasing risk of regional contagion across the broader Sahel and to coastal states in the Gulf of Guinea.
The growing pressure on Bamako
The concerted offensive by JNIM and FLA on April 25, 2026, marks a substantial escalation in Mali’s security crisis. These unexpected and simultaneous attacks on key locations like Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré are part of a continuous deterioration observed since 2020, which intensified following the military junta’s ascent to power in August of that year.
Initially confined to Mali’s northern rural areas, JNIM has steadily enhanced its capability to strike further afield with increased intensity and coordination. In recent years, its operations have expanded towards the western and southern regions of the country, areas previously relatively untouched by such violence. Its influence now extends beyond Malian borders, impacting coastal nations such as Togo, Bénin, and Nigeria. Concurrently, the number of attacks attributed to JNIM has surged, particularly those targeting the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). In July 2024, FAMA, supported by the Russian group Africa Corps, suffered a significant defeat against a coalition of JNIM and the CSD-DPA. Since then, JNIM has launched a series of assaults on military bases in Timbuktu (north), Bamako (south), and Kayes (west). Meanwhile, FAMA has also bolstered its capabilities, notably through Bayraktar drones supplied by Turkey, although these alone are insufficient for comprehensive territorial surveillance.
Since September 2025, JNIM has pursued an economic strangulation strategy targeting Bamako, a capital city of approximately 3.2 million inhabitants. This involves disrupting logistical routes and attacking fuel convoys. The primary objective is to progressively erode the ruling power’s legitimacy. By directly impacting the population’s living conditions, particularly through rising fuel prices and associated economic disruptions, JNIM aims to weaken the junta’s credibility while positioning itself as a viable alternative. The more the junta is perceived as failing in rural areas and Bamako, the more JNIM appears as a credible governance option to the populace. The blockade of the capital serves as a stark demonstration of the state’s impotence. JNIM seeks to enhance its image not by forcibly capturing the capital, but by showcasing an alternative form of authority. In areas under its control, the group has established parallel administrative structures based on Islamic justice, taxation, and trade regulation, enabling it to present a concrete alternative to an absent state.
A military seizure of the capital remains improbable for now, considering JNIM’s estimated strength of 5,000 to 6,000 fighters against a city that concentrates the bulk of Mali’s security forces and infrastructure. JNIM also lacks sufficient popular support, especially in urban centers. However, targeted attacks on the Modibo Keita International Airport, which hosts Africa Corps elements, could become more frequent. Conversely, rural areas, characterized by minimal state presence, provide fertile ground for the group’s entrenchment. Furthermore, the Bamako blockade suggests that a direct military capture of the capital is not a short-term objective; instead, the strategy relies on a predominantly psychological war of attrition. This increasing pressure on Bamako also serves to concentrate FAMA’s responses there, thereby easing their grip on other parts of the territory.
Kidal’s fall and the erosion of the junta’s narrative
The April 25 attacks underscore this surge in JNIM’s operational capacity. In Kati, the heart of Malian military power, Defense Minister Sadio Camara was killed. In Bamako, the Modibo Keita Airport suffered strikes. In Kidal, JNIM and FLA regained control of the city, which FAMA and Wagner had triumphantly recaptured in 2023, hailed then as a historic victory. This strategic reversal is unprecedented since 2013, forcing Africa Corps elements to withdraw from both Kidal and Gao. The immediate question is whether FAMA can reclaim the city in the coming weeks.
Kidal’s recapture by JNIM evokes the dynamics of 2012, when Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups initially cooperated before ideological differences caused a rift. JNIM advocates for the implementation of Sharia law, while Tuareg rebels champion an autonomist agenda focused on Azawad. Kidal then became a symbol of this division, contested by both factions. These divergences persist, yet the identification of common adversaries—the junta and its Russian partner—has fostered an opportunistic tactical convergence. Signals of rapprochement were already circulating in March 2025, with negotiations reportedly taking place in December 2024 to coordinate efforts. The durability of this opportunistic coalition and its ability to maintain control of Kidal remain uncertain.
These attacks occurred despite an alleged truce scheduled for late March 2026 between JNIM and the Malian government, which reportedly involved the release of several
