Why the silence over the Sahel is misleading
The Sahel has vanished from global headlines, overshadowed by crises in Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, and geopolitical upheavals in the United States. Yet beneath this media silence, the region faces escalating jihadist violence and deepening authoritarianism. More than a decade of instability continues unabated, with repercussions that extend far beyond West Africa.
The military regimes that seized power in recent years promised to curb jihadist threats, but their efforts have failed. Instead, violence has intensified across the Sahel, particularly in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso — the three nations that formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023. Today, the Sahel is the global epicenter of jihadist terrorism, with civilian casualties skyrocketing and security forces struggling to maintain control.
At the same time, these governments have tightened their grip on power, indefinitely postponing elections and suppressing dissent. Press freedoms have eroded, journalists face harassment or exile, and civil society organizations operate under constant threat. Arbitrary arrests, forced conscription, and even extrajudicial killings have become tools of control, deepening societal fractures.
Escalating violence: jihadist groups gain ground
Once considered the least violent region in Africa a decade ago, the Sahel now records the highest death toll from extremist violence on the continent. In 2024 alone, deaths linked to jihadist attacks tripled since 2021, reaching over 11,200 fatalities. This toll does not include the 2,430 civilians killed by state security forces and Russian mercenaries in the same year. Shockingly, government-led operations may have caused more civilian deaths than the armed groups themselves — a grim reflection of the region’s collapsing security architecture.
The rise of the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda affiliate, has been particularly devastating. Operating across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, JNIM has demonstrated increasing tactical sophistication, carrying out simultaneous attacks on military and symbolic targets to undermine government credibility and rally local support.
Mali: a nation under siege
Since the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) in 2023, Mali has seen a resurgence of armed conflict. Government forces, backed by Russian Wagner Group mercenaries, now face both jihadist factions and Tuareg separatists in the north. The recapture of Kidal in October 2023 was hailed as a sovereignty victory, but it did little to shift the balance of power.
In July 2024, a coordinated ambush by JNIM and Tuareg fighters near Tinzaouaten killed dozens of Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries — one of Wagner’s heaviest losses in the region. Later that year, the group launched coordinated strikes on a gendarmerie school and Bamako’s military airport, killing over 70 security personnel and destroying a presidential aircraft. These attacks underscored the state’s inability to secure its territory and the growing boldness of jihadist groups.
Civilian communities remain trapped in the crossfire. In July 2024, a wedding party in Mopti was attacked, killing 40 people. In August, military drone strikes in retaliation for the Tinzaouaten ambush killed over 20 civilians. In February 2025, jihadists ambushed a military convoy escorting civilians near Gao, killing more than 50 people. Despite the worsening situation, polls show many Malians still express confidence in their armed forces, reflecting a dangerous disconnect between perception and reality.Burkina Faso: when the state loses control
Since the 2022 military coup, Burkina Faso’s security situation has deteriorated rapidly. By 2024, government forces were estimated to control only 40% of the national territory, with JNIM active in 11 of 13 regions. The death toll from jihadist violence rose by 68% between 2022 and 2023, and 2024 saw even higher casualties — including the deadliest attack in the country’s history.
In August 2024, jihadists ambushed civilians forced to dig trenches near Barsalogho, killing between 130 and 600 people. State forces have also been implicated in atrocities. In February 2024, Human Rights Watch documented the massacre of 223 civilians by the army in two villages. Militant civilian auxiliaries, known as the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), have been accused of killing dozens of Fulani civilians in Solenzo, many of them women, children, and elders. In response, JNIM launched a revenge attack on a military camp in Diapaga, killing over 30 soldiers and VDP members.The government’s strategy of arming civilians has backfired. Since 2020 — and intensified after the 2022 coup — over 50,000 VDP militiamen have been recruited, often from specific communities while excluding others like the Fulani. This has fueled ethnic tensions and blurred the line between state forces, militias, and jihadist groups. Many VDP members are sent to the front lines, effectively serving as cannon fodder. As a result, Burkina Faso now hosts over 2 million internally displaced persons, the highest number in the Sahel.Niger: rising tide of terror
Although Niger has faced fewer jihadist attacks than its AES neighbors, the lethality of violence has surged since the 2023 coup. Military operations have intensified, but so have civilian casualties. Since the coup, state forces have killed three times more civilians than in the previous year, placing communities between the hammer of extremist groups and the anvil of government repression.
In 2024, the army was attacked 51 times in just nine months — nearly double the 2023 figure. Militant groups have become more aggressive, targeting both civilians and security forces. In March 2024, an ambush near Tillabéri killed 23 soldiers. In December, two attacks near the Burkina Faso border claimed 39 civilian lives. In March 2025, an Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) attack on a mosque killed 44 people. Despite modest improvements in governance, the trajectory remains deeply concerning.Political backsliding: military rule entrenches itself
The three AES countries have all delayed elections and extended their transitions indefinitely, using bureaucratic and legal maneuvers to consolidate power. In Mali, the junta — initially promising elections in 2022 — now plans to stay in power until at least 2029. In Burkina Faso, the transition period has been extended to 60 months. Niger’s leadership, too, has avoided setting a clear electoral timeline, recommending a renewable five-year transition after a flawed national dialogue in early 2025.
These prolonged transitions are not accidental. They allow the current regimes to push forward with plans to form a confederation (AES), reduce dependence on regional bodies like ECOWAS, and pursue new international alliances — including growing ties with Russia. With guaranteed years in power and the possibility of re-election, these leaders are reshaping regional politics on their own terms.Media crackdowns: silencing the truthUnable to assert full control over their territories, the military regimes have turned to controlling information. Independent and foreign media have been banned, journalists expelled or arrested, and civil society organizations shut down. In Mali, RFI and France 24 were banned in 2022; by late 2023, local TV channels were targeted, and NGOs were dissolved. Burkina Faso followed a similar path, suspending major international outlets and detaining critics. Niger suspended RFI and France 24 within days of the 2023 coup and has since intensified censorship, including detaining political opponents and restricting foreign travel.
By controlling the narrative, these governments present a distorted image of stability. In October 2024, Burkina Faso claimed to control 70% of its territory — the same percentage attributed to jihadist control by external observers. Such disinformation deepens public confusion and obscures the true scale of the crisis.The Sahel’s silence is not peace
Media silence on the Sahel reflects not stability, but repression and international disengagement. While the world’s attention was elsewhere, humanitarian conditions have worsened dramatically. Between June and August 2025, 52.7 million people in West Africa are expected to face acute food insecurity, a direct consequence of conflict and displacement. The number of internally displaced persons in the Sahel has surged to over 3.1 million as of March 2025.
While the European Union reconsiders its role in the region, the risks of disengagement are clear. Instability in the Sahel does not stay local. Weak governance, jihadist expansion, and mass displacement create fertile ground for transnational crime, migration crises, and radicalization — threats that do not respect borders.The EU must recalibrate its engagement with the Sahel, balancing humanitarian needs with political realism. It must work with local communities, support independent media, and engage with civil society — not just with juntas. The future of the Sahel is not just a regional concern; it is a shared challenge that demands collective action.