The struggle for dominance in the Sahel has entered a dangerous new phase, with militant groups escalating their tactics beyond traditional battlegrounds. As violence intensifies across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and beyond, a troubling pattern of economic warfare has emerged as a key weapon in their arsenal.
By the numbers
From January to November 2025, the human cost of this escalation has become impossible to ignore:
- Militant violence claimed over 10,000 lives in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger alone
- 30 foreign nationals were kidnapped in Mali (22) and Niger (8)
- Benin witnessed a 70% surge in fatalities compared to the same period in 2024
Sahel militants weaponize economic disruption
Jihadist groups in the Sahel have transformed their strategies from conventional warfare to socioeconomic sabotage. In Mali, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) implemented a strategic fuel and transport embargo targeting key cities like Kayes and Nioro du Sahel. This blockade severed critical trade routes, triggering nationwide fuel shortages and price surges that paralyzed the economy and undermined government authority.
In Burkina Faso, JNIM’s military capabilities have evolved dramatically. The group executed rapid captures of provincial capitals like Djibo and Diapaga, followed by a devastating ambush on a military convoy in Soum province that killed approximately 90 soldiers. These operations represent more than just territorial gains—they demonstrate a deliberate campaign to erode state control and challenge military regimes through sustained economic and military pressure.
Niger faces growing vulnerability as militant activities spread into southern regions like Dosso and northern Agadez. The Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) has specifically targeted the Benin-Niger oil pipeline, while kidnappings—including the abduction of an American citizen in Niamey—highlight the expanding reach of militants into previously secure urban centers.
kidnapping campaigns fuel regional instability
Both JNIM and ISSP have launched systematic kidnapping operations targeting foreigners, with record numbers reported in Mali and Niger. JNIM focuses on industrial sites and mining operations, while ISSP has expanded to include high-value Western hostages, often collaborating with criminal networks. These campaigns serve dual purposes: generating revenue through ransom payments and destabilizing regional economies that depend on foreign investment and expatriate labor.
The convergence of these tactics in 2025 marks a turning point, with militant operations expanding southward into coastal West Africa. Northern Benin experienced its deadliest year as JNIM intensified cross-border operations from eastern Burkina Faso, culminating in the killing of over 50 soldiers in Park W and advancing further south into the Borgou department along the Nigerian border.
borderlands become new conflict hotspots
The tri-border area between Benin, Niger, and Nigeria has become a critical flashpoint. Both JNIM and ISSP have established footholds in this region, with ISSP moving closer to the Benin border city of Gaya while continuing operations in Nigeria’s Sokoto and Kebbi states. This expansion creates a dangerous overlap where Sahelian militants, Nigerian extremist factions, and criminal groups increasingly share operational space.
As these groups push into shared territories, the potential for collaboration and competition intensifies. The merging of previously distinct conflict zones creates an interconnected threat environment stretching from Mali to western Nigeria—a development that will likely define militant competition in 2026.
military regimes under siege
The central Sahel’s military regimes face unprecedented challenges as militant groups contest sovereignty across vast rural territories. In Mali and Burkina Faso, sustained offensives have exposed deep structural vulnerabilities, with JNIM imposing economic blockades that intensify civilian hardship and undermine regime legitimacy.
Burkina Faso’s army and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) are overstretched after years of attrition. JNIM’s temporary seizures of major towns reveal both the group’s strategic evolution and the state’s incapacity to defend regional capitals like Fada N’Gourma. Continued military casualties and territorial losses risk triggering the same internal dissent that has toppled previous governments.
Across the region, local self-defense groups that once formed the backbone of counter-insurgency efforts are collapsing. In Mali, many Dozo militias have been disarmed or forced into agreements with JNIM, leaving communities dependent on militant-enforced arrangements for basic security and economic access. In Burkina Faso, the VDP has suffered heavy losses and remains largely defensive, limiting the state’s ability to reclaim territory.
external partnerships offer limited protection
Russia’s military partnership with Sahelian countries through the Africa Corps has provided some support, particularly in securing fuel convoys and key supply routes in southern Mali. However, the limited scope of this assistance has been unable to prevent military advances by militant groups. As Africa Corps focuses on protecting critical infrastructure, the broader security challenges continue to mount.
The combination of sustained militant pressure, weakened local defenses, and declining state capacity creates a perfect storm for political destabilization. If either the Malian or Burkinabe military regimes succumb to internal divisions or popular unrest, the resulting domino effect could place neighboring regimes in increasingly precarious positions.
As 2026 approaches, the central Sahel and its southern borders face a future of deepening political instability and territorial fragmentation—unless decisive action is taken to counter these interconnected threats.