The renationalization of Eneo in Cameroon has drawn concern from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In its latest assessments published in mid-2026, the Fund cautions the Cameroonian government about the potential financial burden of the deal, which saw the state regain control of nearly all shares in the former British private equity firm Actis’s subsidiary. Renamed Société camerounaise d’électricité (Socadel), the company is now 95% state-owned, with the remaining 5% held by employees. The Washington-based institution warns that this move could strain an already tight national budget.
Government takes on hidden liabilities
The IMF’s assessment is blunt: absorbing the historic electricity distributor into public hands transfers structural liabilities that have long gone unresolved. Outstanding tariff imbalances, cross-debts with public administrations, and mounting dues to independent power producers now fall squarely on the national treasury. The Fund notes that these obligations were previously managed by a private operator, but the transfer shifts the burden without addressing the root causes.
Cameroon’s fiscal space remains severely limited. Under a program backed by the Extended Credit Facility and the Extended Fund Facility, the government must balance public debt servicing, fiscal consolidation, and social spending. Integrating Socadel’s cash needs into this equation risks complicating an already delicate balance. The IMF underscores the urgent need to prevent the state-owned utility from becoming a recurring source of unchecked spending.
A financially unsustainable model
The IMF’s concerns extend beyond ownership structure to the very viability of the newly nationalized operator. The Fund describes Socadel’s economic model as fundamentally unbalanced, with user tariffs failing to cover full production and distribution costs. Persistent technical and commercial losses on the grid compound the problem, while government compensation—when provided—often takes the form of implicit subsidies or deferred payments that eventually return to the budget as arrears.
The capital structure reflects this imbalance: 95% state-owned, 5% employee-held. While the latter aims to involve staff in governance, it does little to address the core challenge—Socadel’s financial equilibrium. The IMF points out that Actis’s exit, finalized months earlier, was not accompanied by a comprehensive tariff reform or a sufficiently detailed recovery plan to reassure creditors.
Balancing energy security with fiscal prudence
The Cameroonian electricity sector remains critical, underpinning industrial competitiveness, the phased commissioning of major hydroelectric projects like Nachtigal and Memve’ele, and the national goal of universal energy access by 2030. A collapse in the distributor’s performance could disrupt the entire value chain, from producers to end consumers, including the national grid operator Sonatrel.
The IMF’s prescription centers on three priorities: clarifying Socadel’s mandate, establishing a credible tariff trajectory, and clearing the backlog of cross-debts among the state, independent producers, and the utility. Without these steps, the Fund warns, the risk of repeated recourse to public guarantees remains high. Technical missions from the IMF are expected to scrutinize the company’s governance and operational recovery conditions in the coming months.
Equally pressing is the signal this renationalization sends to investors. The withdrawal of a major private operator from an African utility’s capital, followed by state takeover, raises questions about the predictability of public-private partnership frameworks in the sector. The Cameroonian government must demonstrate that Socadel is not a defensive stopgap but the foundation for a broader reform of energy governance.