On April 25, 2026, a coordinated military offensive was launched in Mali by the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)—Al-Qaïda’s Sahelian affiliate—and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) against Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian partners, the Afrika Korps. The attack has plunged the country into a new phase of conflict with Bamako, reviving fears of a northern takeover reminiscent of March 2012, though the political context today is markedly different. What separates the 2012 crisis from today’s escalation? What short-term outcomes can be anticipated?

Current context: the most ambitious offensive in years

On April 25, 2026, a large-scale assault targeted five key Malian cities: Bamako, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti. This marks the first time since March 2012 that jihadist groups and rebel coalitions have launched a joint offensive of such magnitude. Earlier sporadic coordination since 2024 has evolved into a concrete partnership. Across these cities, attacks focused on FAMa and Russian positions. In Bamako, symbolic sites like the Kati military district and the airport were hit.

A partial assessment, though the situation remains fluid, reveals:

• Northern towns now under rebel and jihadist control. Kidal has fallen, along with nearby Tessalit and Anéfis. Ber, Bourem, Gourma-Rharous, Léré, Intahaka, and Tessit have also been seized, encircling Tombouctou and Gao. However, some northern military bases held by Malian-Russian forces remain under siege, including those in Gao, Tombouctou, and Aguelhok.
• Junta leaders struck directly. Defense Minister General Sadio Camara was killed, while several officials, including General Modibo Koné, head of Mali’s National Security Agency (ANSE), were injured. Meanwhile, President Assimi Goïta, the military junta leader, was reportedly evacuated to Turkey’s embassy before reappearing publicly on April 28 alongside Russian officials.
• Rumors of a junta power struggle involving General Malick Diaw circulated but were never confirmed. One certainty remains: the military leadership has been severely shaken by this assault.

While this offensive echoes 2012, several critical differences stand out:

• The JNIM and FLA are coordinating openly, with JNIM even allowing FLA leaders to take center stage. Unlike Elghabass Ag Intallah and Bilal Ag Cherif of the FLA, JNIM leaders such as Iyad ag Ghali and Hamadoun Kouffa have remained publicly invisible. Only Sidan Ag Hitta, a senior JNIM figure, was spotted in Tessalit.
• Instead of executing captured soldiers as in 2012, the groups now prioritize negotiation and disarmament, allowing FAMa troops to withdraw and urging others to lay down arms. These factions position themselves as protectors of both civilians and soldiers against Bamako’s junta.
• Negotiations with Russian mercenaries allowed their orderly withdrawal from multiple northern bases, including Kidal, mirroring tactics used in Syria. Algeria likely facilitated these talks, possibly in coordination with the FLA.
• The northern advance was enabled by a strategy to pin down FAMa forces in central and southern regions while simultaneously attacking Bamako. The prolonged assault on Bamako is unprecedented.

An anticipated crisis

In a September 15, 2022 analysis, we warned that Russia’s military support was an illusion and would fail to address Mali’s security challenges. The Russian approach was ill-suited and counterproductive, alienating civilians while failing to curb JNIM’s expansion. Our forecasts from early 2023 anticipated the current scenario:

• Tensions between the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and FAMa/Wagner forces would reignite, with CMA—objectively allied with JNIM—supporting efforts to retake northern Mali, potentially extending to half the country.
• Central Mali’s fragmentation would fuel regular clashes between the Macina Katiba and community self-defense militias, likely ceding control to JNIM.
• Bamako’s outskirts would be encircled, though full occupation remains unlikely unless the army collapses entirely.
• The loss of northern Mali would trigger political upheaval, compelling negotiations with JNIM to secure a durable truce, potentially leading to territorial concessions or constitutional changes. Pressure from Malian religious institutions would push authorities toward dialogue.

By November 2023, we noted that Kidal’s recapture by FAMa and Russian forces was short-lived, as the CMA opted for strategic retreat to prepare for a future counteroffensive—a pattern confirmed by the July 2024 battle of Tinzawatene and the recent conquests. These developments confirm the crisis was not a surprise but the result of long-anticipated dynamics. With this in mind, let’s explore the likely short-term evolutions.

Short-term perspectives

In the coming weeks, JNIM and FLA forces will likely negotiate the withdrawal of Russian troops from the north before seizing Gao and Tombouctou, de facto partitioning Mali as occurred in March 2012. At the time, the pattern involved capturing Kidal first, followed by separate offensives on Gao and Tombouctou, with mass desertions by Malian soldiers hastening the collapse. Under current pressure—both military and through negotiations—FAMa’s continued defection seems probable, especially with command chains disrupted and political turmoil in Bamako. If the Russians withdraw from Gao and Tombouctou, the conquest of the entire Niger River loop appears inevitable.

The only factor that could delay this advance is the threat posed by Malian and Burkinabe TB2 drones. While JNIM and FLA may destroy Malian drones, possibly aided by kamikaze drones targeting airfields, targeting Burkinabe or Nigerien drones poses greater challenges.

The North will gradually fall under FLA and JNIM control, especially as their objectives have evolved: the FLA seeks de facto autonomy without political secession, while JNIM appears satisfied with a less stringent application of Islamic law. This reduces the likelihood of a 2012-style scenario where jihadists violently seized cities and imposed strict governance. Recall that in 2013, AQIM’s failure against French forces led its leaders to advocate a softer expansion strategy, focusing on proselytization and limited Islamic law.

Controlling northern Mali will position armed groups strategically but also open two new fronts: against the Islamic State in the Ménaka region and against aerial incursions by Malian and Burkinabe forces. Unlike 2012, JNIM fighters are also active in central Mali, where new offensives against garrisons in Gossi, Boni, Hombori, Niafunké, Konna, Mopti, and Sévaré are likely. Without FLA support in these areas, operations may focus on disrupting FAMa deployments rather than seizing towns. Recent retaliatory attacks against civilians in Kori-Kori and Gomossogou villages underscore this strategy, though they risk clashing with JNIM’s broader political narrative portraying itself as a bulwark against junta violence. Internal command challenges within JNIM remain a persistent vulnerability.

The fate of central and southern Mali is harder to predict for two reasons: first, JNIM has controlled rural areas for years, besieging cities and negotiating local agreements with communities in exchange for limited Islamic law—similar to the Viet Cong in Vietnam or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Second, unlike the Taliban, JNIM lacks sufficient manpower to sustain broad territorial control. However, the 2012-2013 control of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou enabled massive recruitment in central communities. If this strategy repeats, JNIM could significantly strengthen its ranks.

Unless forced into talks, the junta has little incentive to abandon its Russian partnership if it hopes to survive, which may help secure Bamako. If the junta continues paying, it can maintain Russian protection in the capital, though territorial recovery seems improbable. If Russia withdraws support, Mali can only rely on limited help from Burkina Faso and Niger, both embroiled in their own jihadist conflicts. Senegal may mobilize at its border but is unlikely to deploy troops amid JNIM’s growing threat. Algeria, Mauritania, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire are likely to remain observers, privately welcoming the junta’s humiliation while pushing for negotiations.

From a forward-looking perspective:

• Long-term dynamics since 2022 indicate the fall of the North is inevitable, as is the loss of control in the Center. While timing is unclear, the power balance is decisive.
• Medium-term trends show the Russian partnership is fragile and doomed to fail, as is Bamako’s military strategy, as recent events have demonstrated.
• Two potential turning points could emerge:
  – A negotiation process, driven by junta collapse or diplomatic pressure.
  – An external military intervention to reverse battlefield dynamics and alter long- and medium-term trends.

What lies ahead for Mali and the international community?

In this context, several non-exclusive scenarios are likely unfolding.

Scenario 1: Prospects for external military intervention

Scenario 2: Prospects for large-scale political negotiations

Since 2025, JNIM leaders have sought to replicate the success of Syria’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) by nationalizing their struggle, implementing a ‘moderate’ Islamic governance model, and engaging in dialogue with the international community. To achieve this, JNIM has sought a sponsor since 2024, potentially Algeria or Mauritania. The group also aims to adopt a governance model inspired by Mauritania. Both countries maintain close ties with FLA leaders and JNIM cadres, oppose Bamako’s junta, and could play this role—but confirmation remains uncertain.

This strategy anticipates a conquest through junta collapse, followed by negotiations with a political force willing to accept their demands: application of Islamic law nationwide, greater autonomy for the North and Center, and integration of JNIM and FLA into local governance.

A major obstacle persists: unlike HTS, JNIM has not severed ties with Al-Qaïda, nor abandoned its goal of exporting jihadist ideology beyond Mali’s borders. Additionally, JNIM has not engaged in official dialogue with the international community, complicating normalization efforts. It remains unclear whether JNIM is a viable negotiation partner, even with regional and potential European support. The political framework is not yet conducive to such talks.

A comprehensive negotiation would require dialogue with the FLA, building on the Algiers Accords, and with JNIM, aligning with local agreements established with the High Islamic Council of Mali.

Progress hinges on pressure from Russian, Turkish, or African partners (e.g., Togo and Ghana) against the junta. Without such pressure, it will be difficult for Malian forces to regain control through force. The Bamako blockade may spur civil society or a counter-coup, but systematic repression since 2020 suggests the junta feels secure. Until negotiations begin, the strangulation strategy will persist, with captured cities serving as launchpads for further offensives against FAMa.