Following fifteen months of strained relations with Bamako, Algiers has restored diplomatic ties with its southwestern neighbor and reopened its airspace to Malian aircraft. With Niamey, the rapprochement has gone even further, with the delivery of four military helicopters, the revival of oil projects, and the resumption of joint crude marketing. Behind this series of gestures—timed as Morocco strengthens its foothold in the Sahel Alliance states—lies a shared Algerian concern: regaining lost influence south of its borders before Rabat turns its economic and diplomatic presence into lasting political gains.
Recent weeks have highlighted this shift. After a confrontation unprecedented in scale, Algeria moved to mend fences with Mali: on July 10, Abdelmadjid Tebboune ordered the return of Algerian Ambassador Kamal Retieb to Bamako, while Mali announced the same day the restoration of its ambassador in Algiers and the reopening of its airspace to Algerian civilian and military aircraft. This normalization, after fifteen months of crisis, took on new weight in early August when Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga spoke of a «complete convergence of views» between Assimi Goïta and Abdelmadjid Tebboune, particularly on «respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs». For Algiers, the significance of this thaw extends beyond mere bilateral reconciliation: Mali is not only its main Sahelian neighbor but also the political core of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), and above all, the country whose rupture most brutally exposed Algeria’s fading diplomatic clout in the region. Resuming dialogue with Bamako signals Algiers’ intent to rebuild, step by step, the influence it had lost.
The momentum is even more pronounced with Niger. On August 9, Algeria delivered four helicopters to Niger’s armed forces—two Mi-24V combat helicopters and two Mi-171 transport helicopters—along with spare parts, maintenance kits, and ammunition. Days later, the Algerian prime minister traveled to Niamey to oversee the launch of drilling at the Kafra South-East 1 exploration well, coinciding with Sonatrach and Niger’s Société nigérienne des produits pétroliers (Sonidep) announcing their first joint crude marketing operation. In just days, Algiers combined security, hydrocarbons, and economic cooperation—three levers enabling it to reconnect with an AES member whose strategic depth it needs to regain influence south of its borders. The rapprochement with Niamey now takes the form of concrete military, energy, and commercial commitments likely to give Algeria a far more tangible presence in the Sahel.
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso emerge as battlegrounds for regional influence
This acceleration unfolds against a backdrop of profound regional transformation. The three AES states—Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—have severed ties with multiple Western partners, deepened cooperation with Russia, and begun building their own diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation frameworks. In June, their foreign ministers convened in Bamako to implement the «Diplomacy pillar» of the Confederation and define a unified approach. For Algiers, this new landscape poses both a threat to its historic influence and an opportunity to re-engage with governments that, after breaking with Paris and other Western capitals, are seeking fresh alliances. Yet the presence of a third player—the Kingdom of Morocco—makes this reshuffle even more delicate for Algerian authorities. Rabat has staked its claim in the region through a blend of political diplomacy, religious training, investments, infrastructure, and Atlantic-facing outreach.
The rivalry with Morocco lends this Algerian return its true significance, revealing it as essentially a reactive strategy. In March, the Institute for Security Studies noted that Algeria’s economic diplomacy aims «to safeguard Algiers’ regional influence amid Morocco’s advances». The International Crisis Group, in its November 2024 analysis, observed that «Morocco has capitalized on Algeria’s declining clout in the Sahel». The crux of Algeria’s challenge lies here: despite its formidable military strength and energy-driven financial resources, these assets have not translated into commensurate political influence. Morocco, by contrast, has methodically built an ecosystem of interests spanning banking, telecommunications, fertilizers, religious training, and infrastructure. While Rabat seeks to create durable interdependencies, Algiers appears focused on preventing its neighbor from converting its setbacks into diplomatic victories. Observers describe Algeria’s approach as a counteroffensive aimed at reclaiming lost ground and containing Morocco’s expanding influence.
Normalizing ties with Bamako proves pivotal for Algiers
From Algiers’ perspective, the restoration of relations with Mali marks the most consequential development of the year. For fifteen months, the two countries endured a confrontation that seemed to permanently rupture the already volatile relationship built around Algeria’s past mediation efforts. The crisis erupted after Bamako denounced the 2015 peace agreement, escalating further when the Algerian military downed a Malian drone near Tinzaouaten in April 2025. Mali accused Algiers of aggression, to which Algeria responded that the aircraft had violated its airspace. The AES trio then recalled their ambassadors, and the rupture appeared irreversible when Bamako took its case to the International Court of Justice, while Algiers contested the court’s jurisdiction.
The July 10 decision to restore diplomatic relations thus represents a major reversal. Mali announced the return of its ambassador to Algiers and the reopening of its airspace, while Algiers reciprocated by sending its envoy back to Bamako. Within weeks, the tone had shifted further, with Malian references to a «complete convergence of views» with Algiers suggesting that normalization extends beyond administrative formalities. It also offers Algeria a chance to re-engage in discussions on Sahelian security and political futures. The fact that this thaw was facilitated by Niger—itself closely aligned with Algiers—adds a regional dimension to the episode. An analysis published in July noted Moscow’s and Niamey’s roles in brokering the rapprochement between Algiers and Bamako.
Niger, however, illustrates Algeria’s chosen method most clearly. As early as March, the second session of the Algeria-Niger joint commission addressed energy, security, transport, health, finance, and infrastructure. Both governments labeled their relationship «strategically irreversible» and announced a «fully renewed partnership». Since then, commitments have multiplied: the donation of four military helicopters represents the most visible security dimension, while the Kafra South-East 1 drilling and the first joint crude marketing operation give the partnership a tangible economic dimension—though these projects still face real-world challenges.
This strategy responds to both geographic constraints and political necessity. Algeria shares over 1,300 kilometers of border with Mali and a lengthy frontier with Niger—two countries directly exposed to armed groups active across the Sahel. For Algiers, their instability is as much an internal problem as a diplomatic challenge. Yet security doctrine alone no longer suffices to sustain influence: Algeria must now deploy economic and energy tools capable of rivaling those wielded by Morocco. The Trans-Saharan gas pipeline, hydrocarbons, infrastructure, and now military equipment form the pillars of this return.
Morocco’s early lead remains difficult for Algeria to overcome
Algeria’s dilemma is that Morocco did not wait for its return, and many of Rabat’s gains are precisely those Algiers failed to prevent. On April 10, Mali withdrew its recognition of the so-called SADR and declared support for «Morocco’s autonomy plan as the only serious and credible basis». Meanwhile, the three AES states have progressively deepened ties with the Kingdom. For Algiers, this evolution cuts to the heart of its rivalry with Rabat: beyond Sahelian influence, the contest now hinges on each country’s ability to rally African capitals to its stance on the Sahara issue. Cornered, Algiers appears determined to regain ground where Morocco has advanced, to reclaim lost positions, and to stop its rival from reaping political dividends. Its policy is less about conquering new space than about frustrating Morocco’s exploitation of Algeria’s past missteps.
A fragile Algerian recovery
The current phase reveals a catch-up strategy driven by lost influence. After ceding its role as mediator in Mali, Algiers is returning through bilateral ties, hydrocarbons, infrastructure, and security. Niger has become the most advanced testing ground for this approach, while Mali—with restored ambassadors and air links—serves as the major diplomatic test. Burkina Faso completes this framework, though relations with Ouagadougou remain less visible. This recovery is largely about reclaiming positions Algeria once held and preventing them from benefiting Morocco. The obsession with Moroccan competition gives Algeria’s Sahel policy a narrow focus: influence is measured against gains made by its neighbor rather than by the tangible benefits delivered to the states involved. A power seeking lasting influence in a region must present its own compelling offer; Algeria still seems trapped in a reactive mindset where Morocco’s presence is the primary driver of its return.