The shifting landscape of the Malian conflict

In Mali, a critical question now looms over the nation: who truly commands the territory, and what is the ultimate cost to the population? From the northern reaches to the outskirts of Bamako, the reality is defined by a complex web of insurgencies, jihadist factions, government troops, and foreign influences.

This struggle is deeply rooted in the 2012 crisis, a period when northern Mali was torn between a Tuareg uprising and the rapid spread of jihadist groups following the collapse of the state after the March 2012 coup. While the nature of the warfare has evolved over the years, the violence has never truly subsided.

The capture of Kidal by the Mali army in November 2023 served as a major symbolic victory. As a historic stronghold for Tuareg rebels in the northeast, the city’s fall was expected to shift the balance of power. However, instead of ending the crisis, it ignited a fresh cycle of combat and retaliatory strikes.

Current realities on the ground

The security situation has grown increasingly dire since 2024. In September of that year, the GSIM, a jihadist organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility for strikes in Bamako, specifically targeting the Faladié gendarmerie school and the military airport. By the spring of 2026, a series of synchronized offensives once again hit various locations across the country, stretching all the way to the capital.

In response, the authorities in Mali have implemented stringent emergency protocols. As of early June 2026, the sale and use of heavy motorcycles have been prohibited outside of major urban centers, and several military exclusion zones have been established. These measures aim to disrupt the mobility of armed groups who utilize fast-moving vehicles to strike and retreat into the shadows.

For the local population, these restrictions have brought immediate hardship. Travel has become perilous, the local economy is stagnating, and humanitarian aid is increasingly difficult to access. Reports from May 2026 indicate a sharp decline in safety, with civilians facing displacement, loss of life, and severe shortages of food and essential services following the latest waves of violence.

The core of the conflict remains a military deadlock. While the ruling junta strives to re-establish territorial sovereignty, armed groups are playing a game of attrition. Jihadist factions aim to destabilize the state from within, while Tuareg rebels continue to push for the autonomy or independence of Azawad. Though their goals differ, their actions often converge in their opposition to the central government in Bamako.

Geopolitical tensions and foreign influence

The political narrative has become increasingly complicated by international friction. In 2024, the Mali government accused Ukraine of assisting Tuareg rebels after Mali forces and Russian partners suffered significant losses near Tinzaouaten. Kyiv has consistently denied these claims, pointing to a lack of evidence, while the Azawad liberation front also maintains they received no such support.

This diplomatic spat has allowed the junta to sharpen its rhetoric against Ukraine and its Western partners. However, current evidence does not support the idea that France is aligned with jihadist elements. On the contrary, official French policy has shifted toward supporting Ukraine while ending defense cooperation with Bamako, following the 2022 termination of military agreements by Mali authorities.

The withdrawal of French military forces created a security vacuum that Bamako sought to fill by partnering with Russia, initially through Wagner and subsequently through other Russian state mechanisms. While this move bolstered the government’s sovereignist discourse, it has yet to successfully quell the ongoing insurgency.

Strategic gains and civilian losses

Politically, the junta finds strength in framing the conflict as a defense against foreign conspiracies and external enemies. This approach helps consolidate domestic support and justifies heavy security restrictions, though it fails to address deep-seated local grievances or daily safety concerns.

Tuareg rebels gain momentum when they demonstrate their ability to reclaim territory in the north. They have capitalized on the departure of MINUSMA and the general weakening of international oversight. Nevertheless, their occasional and unstable tactical alliances with jihadist groups complicate their international standing and cause significant alarm among local communities.

Jihadist groups are perhaps the primary beneficiaries of the current instability. Their strategy does not require the total conquest of Bamako; rather, they seek to exhaust the state’s resources, disrupt major transport routes, and prove that the government cannot guarantee security. Recent data shows these groups are now striking far beyond their traditional northern bastions.

Ultimately, the civilian population bears the heaviest burden. In the north, residents face constant combat and the threat of reprisal. In Bamako, the 2024 attacks shattered the illusion that the capital was a safe haven. The security measures introduced in 2026 suggest that the Mali state remains in a defensive posture.

Future outlook

The coming months will be defined by both military and diplomatic developments. The evolving relationships between Bamako, Kyiv, Moscow, and other West African capitals will be crucial. Furthermore, the junta’s ability to hold back the GSIM and Tuareg offensives will determine whether Mali can move toward a fragile stability or if it is headed for further escalation.