The perception of France in Gabon has plummeted to historic lows. Fresh data from Afrobarometer reveals that 78% of Gabonese respondents view Paris’ influence as negative, while only 20% hold favorable opinions. This stark divide positions France at the bottom of the list among foreign actors in Libreville, despite the country’s long-standing reputation as a key Francophone stronghold in the Gulf of Guinea.
The disparity becomes even more pronounced when compared to other partners. China leads with 61% positive opinions, followed closely by the African Union (60%), the United States (47%), and Russia (43%). In essence, Gabonese citizens now regard Beijing as a partner three times more legitimate than Paris. This reversed hierarchy underscores a profound shift in diplomatic perceptions in a nation where France’s economic and military presence once seemed unassailable.
Rising discontent mirrors regional trends
The Gabonese case is not an isolated incident. Since French forces withdrew from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, anti-France sentiment has spread across West and Central Africa. Chad demanded a revision of its defense agreements in late 2024, Senegal secured the closure of French military bases, and Ivory Coast followed suit. Gabon, under the military transition led by Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema since August 2023, fits into this broader pattern of reassessing inherited partnerships.
Symbolically, the gradual closure of French military bases on the continent and the downsizing of the French elements in Gabon (EFG) to a cooperation mission have accompanied this shift. Libreville’s official discourse, which emphasizes sovereignty and the diversification of partnerships, resonates with a public weary of an asymmetrical relationship.
China fills the void with tangible partnerships
China’s rise in Gabon isn’t solely due to infrastructure projects or loans. It stems from a conflict-free communication strategy that avoids political demands while highlighting concrete deliverables: roads, hospitals, and telecommunications. Gabon’s manganese, a strategic resource for Beijing, fuels this transactional relationship that many citizens find clearer than the complexities of Franco-Gabonese ties.
Russia, with 43% favorable opinions, benefits from an anti-Western narrative amplified by social media. Despite lacking the economic footprint of China or France, Moscow gains traction among urban youth through a sovereignist discourse. The African Union, at 60%, confirms that continental multilateralism retains strong legitimacy, even amid Gabon’s suspension following the 2023 coup.
Lessons for French diplomacy
For French diplomats, these findings serve as a strategic wake-up call. Gabon remains home to significant French economic interests, including Eramet’s manganese operations, TotalEnergies’ hydrocarbons sector, and banking and logistics subsidiaries. The erosion of France’s image could weaken these positions just as public tenders undergo re-evaluation by transitional authorities.
The CFA franc debate, controversies over cultural restitution, and memories of post-independence interference fuel structural resentment that mere public relations cannot address. The Afrobarometer data suggests that reclaiming favorable opinion will require a fundamental overhaul of France’s diplomatic approach rather than superficial adjustments.
Yet the Gabonese political transition, which must culminate in a presidential election and a return to constitutional order, could reshape the landscape. The next government, elected by the people, will face a critical choice: maintaining economic continuity, meeting popular demands for change, or embracing offers from Beijing, Washington, or Moscow. The path forward remains uncertain but undeniably pivotal for Gabon’s future alliances.